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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. medical device market is the largest in the 
world.1 It has been estimated at $105.8 billion in 2011, and 
seven of the world’s ten largest device manufacturers are U.S. 
companies.2 However, the industry is in the midst of major 
change. In 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
launched a comprehensive review of one of its major pathways 
for devices to enter the market—the 510(k) clearance process.3 
As part of this review, the FDA assembled a number of internal 
working groups, held public meetings, and commissioned the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assemble a committee to conduct 
its own independent evaluation of the 510(k) system.4 In early 
2011, the FDA released its recommendations for approximately 
twenty-five changes it plans to implement.5 There were seven 
additional issues, however, that the FDA recognized as being 
especially problematic.6 The FDA deferred taking actions on 
these particular issues, instead referring them to the IOM 
committee for evaluation.7 
The IOM is the “health arm of the National Academy of 
Sciences,” which together with the National Academy of Engi-
neering and National Research Council form the National 
                                                          
 1. EPSICOM HEALTHCARE INTELLIGENCE, THE MEDICAL DEVICE MARKET: 
USA (2011), available at http://www.marketresearch.com/product/display 
.asp?productid=6134830&SID=60434945-509248120-499165305&curr=USD. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT 
RECOMMENDATIONS: SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF COMMENTS AND NEXT 
STEPS 1 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT 
RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ 
CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM239449.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 3; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PLAN OF ACTION FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION OF 510(K) AND SCIENCE RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011) [here-
inafter FDA, PLAN OF ACTION], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM239450.pdf. 
 6. FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, 
at 2. 
 7. Id. 
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Academies.8 Its mission is to serve as an advisor to the federal 
government.9 As such, it is heavily involved in policy analysis 
and recommendations. In fact, most of its work comes from 
Congress or federal agencies.10 The IOM’s reputation for distin-
guished experts, robust analyses, and fair processes lead to its 
recommendations being heavily relied upon by government offi-
cials and other stakeholders.11 Thus, the IOM is highly influen-
tial in shaping public policy. 
The IOM’s powerful status creates a responsibility to en-
sure that its processes are fair, objective, and inclusive. Unlike 
traditional federal advisory committees, IOM committees that 
advise federal agencies are subject to few legal requirements.12 
For example, they do not have to publish notice of meetings in 
the Federal Register, may deliberate in private, do not require 
monitoring by federal officials, and do not need to release for 
public comment their recommendations before issuing them in 
final form.13 Additionally, the IOM alone determines who is ap-
pointed to each committee.14 However, like advisory commit-
tees, IOM committees are required to be “fairly balanced . . . for 
the functions to be performed.”15A committee that is not fairly 
balanced lacks the essential expertise and perspectives to ade-
quately fulfill its functions. Such a committee’s recommenda-
tions may thus be incomplete or ill-informed. Additionally, the 
committee risks actual or perceived bias, threatening stake-
holder acceptance of its recommendations. To avoid relying on 
                                                          
  
 8. About the IOM, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
 9. See COMM. ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS, PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS iv (Theresa Wizemann ed. 2010) [hereinafter PUBLIC 
HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS], available 
at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12960&page=R1 (“The Insti-
tute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences 
by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government . . . .”). 
 10. See About the IOM, supra note 8. 
 11. Cf. id. (discussing the IOM’s stellar reputation and work with Con-
gress and federal agencies). 
 12. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5–14 
(2006) (governing federal advisory committees). IOM committees are only gov-
erned by FACA section 15. Id. § 15. 
 13. Compare 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5–14 (statutory requirements for federal 
advisory committees), with id. § 15 (requirements for NAS committees). 
 14. Id. § 15(b)(1). 
 15. Id. 
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such an unbalanced committee, federal law prohibits the FDA 
from using any report issued by a committee that lacks fair 
balance.16 
This Article17 contends that, while the IOM is generally an 
invaluable policy resource, its Committee on the Public Health 
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process (510(k) 
Committee)18 is not fairly balanced. The committee’s primary 
function is to evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient 
safety and innovation,19 but the committee lacks patients, pa-
tient advocates, inventors and innovators who are familiar with 
the 510(k) system, product developers, entrepreneurs, financi-
ers, manufacturers, and medical device industry professionals. 
These critical omissions in 510(k) Committee membership ren-
der the committee unbalanced and thus unable to fairly and ac-
curately perform its duties. Additionally, the committee does 
not contain a balance of perspectives, subjecting it to possible 
bias, or at least the appearance of bias. For these reasons, the 
FDA is legally prohibited from using “any advice or recommen-
dation provided by” the 510(k) Committee.20 Furthermore, by 
releasing its report before these issues could be resolved, IOM 
has risked damaging its well-deserved reputation for quality 
and objectivity. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the 
FDA’s 510(k) clearance process and discusses some of the con-
troversy regarding the adequacy of that process. Part II reviews 
the federal law that applies to advisory committees generally 
as well as the specific provisions that pertain to IOM commit-
tees. This Part also discusses the requirement that IOM com-
mittees be “fairly balanced” and suggests how courts might in-
terpret that requirement. Part III presents the National 
Academies’ policies regarding committee member selection and 
committee operation. It focuses on the Academies’ policies re-
                                                          
 16. Id. § 15(a). 
 17. This Article is an expansion of an earlier piece on this subject by the 
authors. See Ralph F. Hall & Eva Stensvad, Recent Development, A Failure to 
Comply: An Initial Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medical Device Study Com-
mittee, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 731 (2011). 
 18. Activity: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Pro-
cess, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess 
.aspx (last visited Oct. 30 , 2011). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(a). 
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garding balance, bias, and conflicts of interest. Part IV closely 
examines the 510(k) Committee’s purpose and composition, 
concluding that the committee lacks the balance of expertise 
and perspectives necessary to fulfill its function. Finally, Part V 
addresses other policy considerations that dictate a balanced 
committee. The Article concludes that given the 510(k) Com-
mittee’s composition, the FDA is statutorily barred from using 
the committee’s report. Further, IOM should not have released 
its report before these serious issues could be resolved. 
The issue presented by this Article is a matter of fair pro-
cess—the final report’s recommendations and the authors’ opin-
ions regarding those recommendations are irrelevant.21 If fed-
eral agencies intend to rely on IOM committees when making 
major policy and regulatory decisions, those IOM committees 
must follow good processes and contain fair balance. At the 
very least, they must comply with the few statutory require-
ments that apply to them. 
II. FDA’S 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
The FDA is an agency within the Department of Health 
and Human Services.22 It has two primary functions with re-
spect to medical devices. First, it is “responsible for protecting 
the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security 
of . . . medical devices.”23 Second, it is “responsible for advanc-
ing the public health by helping to speed innovations.”24 Given 
the inherent tension between thoroughly ensuring that devices 
are safe and effective and optimally promoting innovation, the 
FDA attempts to balance these goals through its device ap-
proval and clearance mechanisms. In particular, the 510(k) 
                                                          
 21. At the time this Article was drafted, IOM recommendations had not 
yet been released to the public. The 510(k) Committee Report was released in 
the summer of 2011, despite the defects in the committee’s membership.  See 
COMM. ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS, INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE 
FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (2011) [hereinafter MEDICAL 
DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH], available at http://www.nap.edu/cata 
log.php?record_id=13150. 
 22. FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm192695.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2011). 
 23. What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/default.htm (last updated Nov. 18, 2010). 
 24. Id. 
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process aims to make safe and effective devices available to 
consumers more quickly and less expensively,25 thus promoting 
innovation in the device industry.26 
Before a manufacturer can market a medical device in the 
United States, the medical device is first classified into “one of 
three regulatory classes based on the level of [regulatory] con-
trol necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of the de-
vice.”27 Device classification is essentially risk-based, with 
Class I devices being the lowest risk and Class III being the 
highest.28 For non-exempt devices,29 manufacturers must ob-
tain FDA approval or clearance through one of two main path-
ways.30 The first pathway, for higher-risk or Class III devices,31 
                                                          
 25. See infra notes 47–49. 
 26. PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS, supra note 9, at 1−2. 
 27. Device Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice 
(last updated Apr. 27, 2009). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Most low-risk medical devices, such as crutches, heating pads, ther-
mometers, tongue depressors, and bandages, are specifically exempt from any 
premarket notification or review. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 862–92 (2011). This exemp-
tion includes almost all Class I devices and some Class II devices. Medical De-
vice Exemptions 510(k) and GMP Requirements, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2011). Class I devices are those low-risk devices for which general con-
trols (such as good manufacturing practices) are sufficient to ensure safety 
and effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1). Class II devices are moderate-risk 
devices for which both general and special controls (such as postmarket sur-
veillance, patient registries, or specific FDA guidance) are required. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 860.3(c)(2). 
 30. Investigational Device Exemptions (IDE) “allow[] . . . investigational 
device[s] to be used in a clinical study to collect the safety and effectiveness 
data required for a Premarket Approval (PMA)” or 510(k) submission. Over-
view of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHTrans 
parency/ucm203018.htm (last updated May 19, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Over-
view of Medical Devices]. There is also the Humanitarian Device Exemption 
(HDE) for situations involving less than 4000 products, which will not be dis-
cussed here. Id. 
 31. “Class III devices are those that support or sustain human life, are of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or which 
present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Premarket Approv-
al (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices 
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissi
ons/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010) [herein-
after FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA)]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(3) (2011) 
(giving the regulatory definition of a Class III device). Classification regula-
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is Premarket Approval (PMA).32 This is the most stringent type 
of device application process required by the FDA, requiring ex-
tensive scientific and regulatory review to ensure the device’s 
safety and effectiveness prior to marketing.33 Although FDA 
regulations provide 180 days to review the PMA and make a 
determination, actual review usually takes a lot longer.34 Ap-
proval is based on the strength of the scientific and clinical da-
ta as well as inspections of the manufacturing facility, process-
es, and regulatory compliance.35 
The second pathway to market is the 510(k) clearance pro-
cess, or premarket notification, pursuant to section 510(k) of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.36 This process can be used 
for moderate-risk devices (generally Class II devices) that do 
not require a PMA and for which a “predicate” device exists.37 
It can also be used when a manufacturer seeks a new indica-
tion or “intended use” for an already-marketed device or when 
the manufacturer has changed the design or characteristics of a 
device such that it might affect its performance, safety, or effec-
tiveness.38 The manufacturer must submit a 510(k), which is a 
premarket submission made to the FDA, to demonstrate that 
                                                          
tions can be found at 21 C.F.R. §§ 868–92. Examples of Class III devices in-
clude heart valves, defibrillators, and various implantable materials such as 
prostheses, cochlear implants, and breast implants. See FDA, Overview of 
Medical Devices, supra note 30. 
 32. FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 31; 21 U.S.C. § 360e 
(2006). 
 33. FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 31. 
 34. Id. 
 35. MICHELE SCHOONMAKER, THE U.S. APPROVAL PROCESS FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICES: LEGISLATIVE ISSUES AND COMPARISON WITH THE DRUG MODEL 16 
(2005). 
 36. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006). 
 37. FDA, Overview of Medical Devices, supra note 30. Examples of Class 
II devices include infusion pumps, blood pressure cuffs, ventilators, x-ray sys-
tems, and various surgical materials. See id. Where a predicate device does 
not exist, applicants may use the “de novo” process to seek reclassification 
based upon a risk assessment of the product, possibly enabling them to utilize 
the 510(k) system rather than the default PMA pathway. See 21 U.S.C. § 
360c(f)(2) (2006); see also Special Considerations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134578
.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010). 
 38. Premarket Notification (510k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.ht
m (last updated Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Premarket Notification 
(510k)]. 
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the device to be marketed is at least as safe and effective as 
(i.e., substantially equivalent to) a legally marketed device, or 
“predicate” device.39 A predicate device is one “that was legally 
marketed prior to May 28, 1976” for which a PMA is not re-
quired, “a device which has been reclassified from [C]lass III to 
[C]lass II or I . . . , or a device which has been found to be sub-
stantially equivalent through the 510(k) premarket notification 
process.”40 Once the manufacturer makes its 510(k) submission, 
the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) within 
the FDA has ninety days to determine whether the device is, in 
fact, substantially equivalent.41 Once the FDA declares a device 
substantially equivalent, the manufacturer may immediately 
market the device.42 
Compared to the PMA process, the 510(k) process is differ-
ent in three key ways. First, it is generally less stringent—
PMAs require scientific and clinical studies and a more thor-
ough FDA review including inspection of manufacturing facili-
ties, whereas substantial equivalence for 510(k)s is usually 
based on device descriptions and technical data.43 Second, it is 
usually much faster—the FDA generally makes 510(k) deci-
sions more quickly than it does PMA decisions.44 Third, 510(k)s 
are significantly less expensive than PMAs.45 For example, in 
fiscal year 2012, the standard fee for a PMA was $220,050.46 In 
contrast, the standard 510(k) fee was only $4049.47 For these 
                                                          
 39. Id. A finding of substantial equivalence does not mean that the devic-
es are identical—it means that when looking at the intended use of the device 
and its technological characteristics, there are no new questions raised as to 
the device’s safety and effectiveness. Id. 
 40. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(3) (2011). 
 41. FDA, Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 38. Alternatively, the 
FDA can “find the device not substantially equivalent (NSE) . . . , or request 
additional information” giving the manufacturer an additional thirty days. 
SCHOONMAKER, supra note 35, at 14. 
 42. FDA, Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 38. 
 43. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: 
FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE 
APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 14–
15 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 15. 
 45. Id. 
 46. PMA Review Fees, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Med 
icalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Premar 
ketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm048161.htm (last updated Sept. 
13, 2011). 
 47. Premarket Notification [510(k)] Review Fees, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
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reasons—and because most new medical devices are similar to 
products already on the market, do not present any new safety 
or technical questions, and do not represent a significant health 
risk48—the 510(k) process is heavily utilized by the medical de-
vice industry. In 2009, the FDA received 3597 510(k)s, only 20 
original PMAs, and 1394 PMA supplements.49 In 2010, 2766 
medical devices were cleared through the 510(k) process.50 Be-
tween January and September 2011, 2281 devices had been 
cleared.51 
Despite the advantages of the 510(k) process, it has recent-
ly come under attack. Stakeholders on both sides have criti-
cized the process as inadequately protecting public health—
either by insufficiently ensuring patient safety or by unneces-
sarily hindering innovation.52 For example, Public Citizen, a 
national nonprofit organization, fervently argues that the 
510(k) process clears devices too easily and “has failed to keep 
dangerous and ineffective medical devices from the market.”53 
Supporting this assertion, a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) study found that between 2003 and 2007, the FDA re-
viewed 13,199 510(k) submissions for Class I and II devices and 
cleared ninety percent for marketing.54 It also found that the 
                                                          
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134566
.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011). 
 48. OCD FY2006: FDA Goal 2—Increasing Access to Innovative Products 
and Technologies to Improve Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm12930
1.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2010). 
 49. OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2009 4−5 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM223893.pdf. 
 50. See Devices Cleared in 2010, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApp
rovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm199998.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 
2011) (totaling the number of 510(k) clearances for all of 2010). 
 51. See Devices Cleared in 2011, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApp
rovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm242632.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 
2011) (totaling the number of 510(k) clearances between January and Septem-
ber). 
 52. FDA 510(K) AND THE PUB. HEALTH, supra note 9, at 15–16; MEDICAL 
DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 4. 
 53. Comments on FDA 510(k) Medical Devices Working Group Preliminary 
Report and Recommendations, PUB. CITIZEN (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=4535. 
 54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 6. This study 
did not look at all 510(k) submissions—for specific study methodology, see id. 
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FDA reviewed 342 submissions for Class III devices and 
cleared sixty-seven percent for marketing.55 In 2010, seventy-
three percent of 510(k) submissions resulted in a substantially 
equivalent determination, and in the first eight months of 2011, 
that number rose again to seventy-seven percent.56 
Conversely, other groups argue that the 510(k) process is 
so burdensome, unpredictable, and inconsistent that it actually 
inhibits innovation.57 A survey of over two hundred medical 
technology companies found that the inefficient, prolonged 
premarket regulatory process resulted in devices being availa-
ble in the United States a full two years later than in other 
countries, having a significant effect on patient health in the 
United States.58 As a result of the perceived flaws of the regula-
tory system, “[f]ewer medical device start-ups are being 
launched in the U.S. . . . [a]nd innovators . . . are relocating to 
other countries.”59 In addition, although the FDA clears a sig-
nificant percentage of devices, at least one analysis has shown 
that the vast majority of 510(k) clearances do not result in a 
Class I safety recall60 over a five-year period.61 
                                                          
at 30. 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INITIAL RESULTS OF 510(K) AUDIT: 
ANALYSIS OF NOT SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT (NSE) DETERMINATIONS 2 
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ 
CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM259187.pdf. 
 57. See, e.g., JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 6–7 (2010) (surveying over two hundred medical 
technology companies and finding that most respondents found the regulatory 
process to be unpredictable, prolonged, inefficient, and expensive). 
 58. Id. at 7. “Under current FDA processes, millions of U.S. patients are 
being denied or delayed access to leading medical devices that are first (or ex-
clusively) brought to market in other countries.” Id. at 8. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. Class I recalls are the most serious recalls, in which “there is a rea-
sonable probability that the use of . . . a violative product will cause serious 
adverse health consequences or death.” Background and Definitions, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ucm165546.htm (last 
updated June 24, 2009). 
 61. Ralph F. Hall, Univ. of Minn., Using Recall Data to Assess the 510(k) 
Process (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/ 
Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/2010-JUL-28/06%20Hall. 
pdf. This study found that 99.55% of all devices cleared through the 510(k) 
process over a five-year period did not result in a Class I recall for any reason, 
and 99.78% the devices did not experience Class I safety recalls related to any 
premarket issue. Id. In sum, only 0.22% of cleared devices resulted in a recall 
related to premarket issues. Id. 
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Because of the widespread criticism of the premarket regu-
latory process, the FDA launched a review of the 510(k) system. 
In September 2009, the FDA established two staff commit-
tees—the 510(k) Working Group and the Task Force on the Uti-
lization of Science in Regulatory Decision Making—to review 
and address concerns regarding the 510(k) program.62 In Au-
gust 2010, the two internal working groups issued fifty-five 
recommendations, and after reviewing public comments, the 
FDA announced in January 2011 the twenty-five actions it 
plans to take to improve the 510(k) program.63 
In addition to its internal working groups, the FDA also 
commissioned the IOM to conduct a detailed external review of 
the system.64 This IOM committee was formed in early 2010 
and held three public meetings in March, June, and July 
2010.65 In the FDA’s January 2011 work plan, it specifically re-
ferred seven important questions to this IOM committee.66 
However, the 510(k) Committee held no public meetings after 
the FDA referred these questions to it.67 The IOM committee 
completed its analysis and conducted a peer review process 
that did not include any public discussion of proposed recom-
mendations. 68 The committee then released its report on July 
29, 2011.69 
                                                          
 62. JEFFREY SHUREN, CDRH PRELIMINARY INTERNAL EVALUATIONS: 
FOREWORD: A MESSAGE FROM THE CENTER DIRECTOR 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM220782.pdf. 
 63. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA to Improve Most Common 
Review Path for Medical Devices (Jan. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm240418.
htm. 
 64. See FDA 510(K) AND THE PUB. HEALTH, supra note 9, at 1. 
 65. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19; 
Meetings, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Global/Meetings.aspx?activ 
ity={F0FB3742-55FD-4398-A383-DB71604B2FC7} (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 66. FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, 
at 2. 
 67. See MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19 
(indicating that the last public meeting was held in July 2010). 
 68. Drafts of IOM reports remain confidential until after the report is in-
dependently reviewed. See NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS: ENSURING 
INDEPENDENT, OBJECTIVE ADVICE (n.d.) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., OUR 
STUDY PROCESS], available at http://www.nationalacademies.org 
/studycommitteprocess.pdf. Only after all committee members and appropriate 
officials sign off on the final report is the report released to the public. Id. 
 69. Press Release, Nat’l Acads., FDA Should Invest in Developing a New 
Regulatory Framework to Replace Flawed 510(k) Medical Device Clearance 
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III. THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT 
IOM committees do not operate in a legal vacuum—they 
are governed by section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA).70 This next section discusses FACA’s history and 
application to IOM committees. It then examines the require-
ments imposed by section 15 on IOM committees. Finally, it 
discusses whether judicial review of IOM committees is possi-
ble and, if so, what such review might entail. 
A. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT AND AMENDMENTS 
FACA was originally enacted in 1972 in order to address 
concerns that advisory committees71 were disorganized, dupli-
cative, not properly overseen, and lacking in public involve-
ment.72 The purpose of the Act is “to reduce wasteful expendi-
ture on advisory committees and to make advisory committees 
established by the executive branch of government more ac-
countable to the public”73 by “provid[ing] standards for the es-
                                                          
Process (July 29, 2011), available at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/ 
onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13150. 
 70. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (2006). 
 71. Advisory committees are generally “entities created to provide the 
Government with expert advice and collective recommendations from the pri-
vate sector.” Virginia A. McMurtry, Introduction and Legislative History of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463), in VIRGINIA A. 
MCMURTRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95TH CONG., FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 92-463): SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Comm. Print 1978). FACA defines “adviso-
ry committees” as 
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task 
force, or other similar group . . . which is . . . (a) established by statute 
or reorganization plan, or (b) established or utilized by the President, 
or (c) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of 
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more 
agencies or officers of the Federal Government. 
5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2) (2006). The current definition specifically excludes any 
committee created by the National Academy of Sciences. Id. 
 72. See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act, 160 A.L.R. FED. 483 (2000) (discussing the en-
actment of FACA). 
 73. Id. at 483; see also Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). FACA’s purpose was “to control the advisory commit-
tee process and to open to public scrutiny the manner in which government 
agencies obtain advice from private individuals.” Food Chem. News, Inc. v. 
Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1974); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 459 (1989) (“FACA’s principal purpose was to 
enhance the public accountability of advisory committees . . . .”). 
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tablishment, operation, termination, and control of advisory 
committees.”74 It imposed a number of requirements on adviso-
ry committees including fair balance on committees, filing of 
committee charters, notice and publication of meetings in the 
Federal Register, public access to meetings and records, moni-
toring of meetings by federal officials, and limited committee 
duration.75 It also provided for Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) oversight.76 
FACA applies to advisory committees that are “estab-
lished” or “utilized” by federal agencies.77 As originally enacted, 
FACA was not intended to apply to committees formed by the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS),78 of which the IOM is a 
part.79 NAS is a private, independent organization of scientists 
and academics, chartered by Congress in 1863 to “investigate, 
examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science.”80 
Its original purpose was to provide the government with inde-
pendent advice on scientific matters.81 It “consists of members 
elected by peers in recognition of distinguished achievement in 
their respective fields.”82 NAS has about 2100 members, and 
the IOM has about 1600 members.83 While the NAS and IOM 
are technically independent and do not receive “direct appro-
priations from the federal government, . . . many of [their] ac-
tivities are mandated and funded by Congress and federal 
                                                          
 74. Exec. Order No. 11,686, 37 Fed. Reg. 21,421 (Oct. 7, 1972). 
 75. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5–14 (2006); see also S. Rep. No. 92-1098 (1972). 
 76. S. Rep. No. 92-1098. OMB’s oversight was later transferred to the 
General Services Administration. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 12. 
 77. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2). 
 78. “The concept of extending FACA to privately managed and controlled 
organizations outside the Federal government such as the National Academy 
of Sciences was discussed and rejected when the FACA legislation was adopt-
ed by the House of Representatives.” 143 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1997) (citing 118 
CONG. REC. 31,421 (1972)). 
 79. NAS established the IOM in 1970. History of the National Academies, 
NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2011). Over the years, NAS has evolved to incorporate not only 
IOM, but also the National Academy of Engineering and the National Re-
search Council. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS 2 
(2005), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/CommitteePro 
cess.pdf. Together, these organizations are collectively known as the National 
Academies. Id. 
 80. Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/ 
about/whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 81. Id. 
 82. History of the National Academies, supra note 79. 
 83. Id. 
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agencies.”84 In fact, approximately ninety percent of NAS re-
ports are requested by government agencies or legislative 
committees of Congress.85 The NAS and IOM are highly influ-
ential organizations due to the wealth of expertise among their 
membership, the high quality of their work, and their well-
earned “solid reputation[s] as the nation’s premier source of in-
dependent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medi-
cal issues.”86 
For twenty-five years, FACA was not applied to NAS—it 
was only applied to committees “subject to actual management 
and control by a Federal agency.”87 However, in 1997, the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Ani-
mal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala88 held that FACA 
should apply to committees formed by NAS because NAS is a 
“quasi-public” organization that receives public funds, was 
formed by the government, and generally operates for the gov-
ernment’s benefit.89 The court found the NAS committee was 
“utilized” by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices and thus subject to FACA’s many requirements.90 
Congress became concerned that the District Court’s deci-
sion could “impose significant burdens on the Federal govern-
ment”91 and interfere with the independence and quality of 
NAS studies. In response, Congress passed the Federal Adviso-
                                                          
 84. Who We Are, supra note 80. 
 85. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1997) (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn). 
“Federal agencies are the primary financial sponsors of the Academies’ work.” 
NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68. 
 86. Our Reputation, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/ 
about/reputation.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). NAS has an entire webpage 
of quotes extolling the prestige, reputation, credibility, and influence of the 
NAS. Id. 
 87. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844. Analysis of cases prior to 1997 is irrelevant 
when analyzing current FACA requirements for NAS committees because of 
the specific FACA amendment concerning NAS in 1997. See Federal Advisory 
Committee Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-153, 111 Stat. 2689. 
 88. 114 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 89. Id. at 1209–10; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 
F.3d 424, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 90. 114 F.3d at 1209–10. 
 91. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844. It would have nearly “double[d] the number of 
discretionary committees subject to the FACA chartering requirements, al-
most double[d] the number of discretionary committees that must be moni-
tored by Federal officials, and significantly increase[d] the administrative 
burdens on OMB and GSA in overseeing FACA committees.” Id. 
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ry Committee Act Amendments of 1997,92 including the now-
numbered section 15, in order to “clarify public disclosure re-
quirements that are applicable to the National Academy of Sci-
ences.”93 The purpose of the amendments was twofold. First, 
the amendments sought to make it clear that the “academy 
should not be subject to the full process of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act.”94 Congress considered the Academies “valua-
ble to America precisely because they are independent of agen-
cy influence” and because they include the “best professionals 
and experts” and “derive their recommendations from multiple 
perspectives.”95 FACA imposed rigorous procedural require-
ments which could potentially affect NAS’s independence.96 For 
those reasons, Congress wanted to ensure NAS’s independence 
from the government to “preserve their high quality, objective, 
independent studies.”97 
Second, the amendments “require[d] more openness when 
Federal agencies utilize the academies.”98 Congress recognized 
that NAS often provided the government with advice and need-
ed to balance NAS’s “need for independence with the public’s 
right to know about the advisors and procedures used to pro-
duce technical or policy advice for the government.”99 These 
openness and accountability requirements included that NAS 
“[p]ost for public comment the names, biographies, and conflict 
of interest disclosures when committee members are nominat-
ed.”100 It also required open data-gathering meetings, posting 
for public comment the names of reviewers of draft committee 
reports, and making summaries available to the public of any 
closed committee meetings.101 Importantly, the amendments 
required that NAS committee membership be fairly balanced 
“for the functions to be performed.”102 
  
                                                          
 92. 111 Stat. 2689. 
 93. 143 CONG. REC. 25,842 (1997) (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn). 
 94. Id. at 25,843. 
 95. Id. at 25,845. 
 96. Id. (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 25,843 (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn). 
 99. Id. at 25,845 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman). 
 100. Id. (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn). 
 101. Id. 
 102. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006). 
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B. NAS “FAIR BALANCE” REQUIREMENTS UNDER FACA SECTION 
15 
Section 15 was intended to make NAS committees more 
open and accountable, without sacrificing their independence 
and objectivity.103 Among the other requirements previously 
discussed, section 15 provides that “[NAS] shall make its best 
efforts to ensure that . . . the committee membership is fairly 
balanced as determined by the Academy to be appropriate for 
the functions to be performed.”104 This “fair balance” require-
ment serves two important purposes. First, it ensures that the 
committees upon which federal agencies rely are objective and 
unbiased. Second, it guarantees that these committees include 
the variety of perspectives and expertise necessary to fulfill the 
committees’ functions. If a committee lacks balance, it may be 
inadequate to competently accomplish its task. Even if the 
range of expertise is adequate, the committee’s work and agen-
cy’s reliance on it may still be perceived as biased. 
Additionally, individuals with conflicts of interest should 
not serve on the committee unless the conflict is “unavoidable” 
and “is promptly and publicly disclosed.”105 The statute itself 
does not define when a conflict of interest is “unavoidable,” and 
there is no useful discussion of this issue contained in the legis-
lative history. A plain reading of the statute as well as the 
IOM’s practices in past committees106 indicate that this is not a 
statutory bar against including members with conflicts of in-
terest, but merely discouragement of such practice unless the 
individuals are needed to provide a necessary perspective or 
area of expertise. The NAS and IOM have definitions and poli-
cies of their own regarding such conflicts, which will be dis-
cussed later in this Article. 
Section 15 sets forth this “fair balance” requirement as a 
                                                          
 103. Section 15 applies to “the National Academy of Sciences as a corpora-
tion, and therefore to the National Academies as a whole, including the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National 
Research Council.” NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND 
BALANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR COMMITTEES USED IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF REPORTS 2 (2003) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON 
COMMITTEE COMPOSITION], available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/ 
coi/bi-coi_form-0.pdf. 
 104. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (b)(1). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See infra notes 191–210 and accompanying text. 
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separate, additional requirement from public notice of meet-
ings,107 open data-gathering meetings,108 public accessibility to 
materials,109 public availability of final reports,110 and public 
availability of reviewers’ names.111 Therefore, while public in-
put and access to other parts of the committee’s work and data-
gathering are valuable, these other mechanisms for public par-
ticipation cannot compensate for a committee’s failure to meet 
the fair balance requirement. Importantly, the statute specifi-
cally requires fair balance among the committee membership, so 
fair balance during the peer review process alone also fails to 
satisfy FACA section 15. The NAS committee itself must have 
fair balance, regardless of how much public input and balance 
is present throughout the rest of the process. 
Importantly, if a NAS committee fails to comply with the 
statute—for example, by not being fairly balanced—then “[a]n 
agency may not use any advice or recommendation” provided 
by that committee.112 Therefore, while NAS is free to include 
whomever it wants on its committees, if that committee compo-
sition does not comply with FACA requirements, then the FDA, 
a federal agency, is legally prohibited from using that commit-
tee’s work. 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMITTEE BALANCE113 
FACA section 15 grants the IOM a great deal of discretion 
in committee membership—for example, the IOM has almost 
complete discretion as to which specific individuals it appoints 
to serve on its committees.114 Additionally, the IOM can deter-
mine when a conflict of interest is unavoidable.115 However, the 
IOM’s discretion is not absolute. The statute dictates the com-
mittee membership be fairly balanced for its given functions—
                                                          
 107. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(2). 
 108. Id. § 15(b)(3). 
 109. Id. § 15(b)(3), (4). 
 110. Id. § 15(b)(5). 
 111. Id. § 15(b)(6). 
 112. Id. § 15(a). 
 113. There are a number of avenues through which committee composition 
may be reviewed and challenged, and judicial review is just one option. For 
example, any person can submit a Citizen Petition, requesting the FDA to re-
frain from taking any administrative action. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2010). The 
different mechanisms of challenging agency regulations are beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 114. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1). 
 115. Id. 
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the IOM may only decide how to achieve this balance, not 
whether to achieve this balance.116 While balance need not be 
perfect, the IOM must make its “best efforts” to ensure that 
such balance on the committee is present. Thus, while the IOM 
has discretion as to how to achieve fair balance, an utter failure 
to comply, or even attempt to comply, with this statute could 
result in judicial review of the FDA’s use of an IOM commit-
tee’s advice. 
There is currently no existing case law in which an IOM 
committee’s composition was challenged under FACA section 
15. However, case law under section 5 of FACA may provide 
useful guidance as to when and how a court might evaluate 
such a challenge. Section 5 deals with official federal advisory 
committees (not IOM committees), but it contains similar lan-
guage to section 15. Section 5 requires that “the membership of 
the advisory committee . . . be fairly balanced in terms of the . . 
. functions to be performed.”117 Courts examining section 5 have 
concluded that this “‘fairly balanced’ requirement was designed 
to ensure that persons or groups directly affected by the work 
of a particular advisory committee would have some represen-
tation on the committee.”118 Furthermore, “[u]nder FACA, 
                                                          
 116. While the statute says that fair balance must be “determined by the 
Academy,” id., this phrase cannot be read so as to confer upon NAS unfettered 
discretion by removing a court’s authority to review statutory compliance. 
Otherwise, NAS could theoretically appoint anyone to a committee—for exam-
ple, it could select a committee comprised entirely of industry representa-
tives—and sprinkle the magic words “fairly balanced” over it. Without any 
possibility of reviewing NAS’s fair balance determination, there would be no 
means to challenge NAS or any federal agency using the NAS committee un-
der this statute. Such a reading would render the entire statutory provision 
meaningless. It is well accepted that statutes should be read as to “give effect, 
if possible, to every clause and word . . . .” Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 
152 (1883). Furthermore, there is a “strong presumption that Congress in-
tends judicial review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family 
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 
498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (“[I]t is most unlikely that Congress intended to fore-
close all forms of meaningful judicial review . . . .”). The Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which governs the FDA, provides that “final agency action for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.” 5 
U.S.C. § 704 (2006). Therefore, there must be some form of meaningful judicial 
review of FDA’s compliance with this statute—which entails some evaluation 
of NAS’s determinations of fair balance. NAS’s discretion cannot be entirely 
beyond review. 
 117. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2006). 
 118. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing 
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agencies should not be permitted to assign advisory committees 
functions that the committee members do not have the exper-
tise to perform.”119 
This section 5 language is strikingly similar to the fair bal-
ance requirement in section 15, and it may be fair to presume 
that Congress intended the same meaning and application of 
this phrase within the statute when it enacted section 15.120 
Section 5 also requires fair balance with respect to points-of-
view represented on the committee.121 While section 15 does 
not explicitly require point-of-view balance, such balance may 
nevertheless be necessary for an IOM committee to adequately 
fulfill its function—a biased IOM committee may be unable to 
competently address the issues with which it has been 
tasked.122 Therefore, committee members’ points-of-view must 
be considered when evaluating whether the committee is fairly 
balanced to perform its functions. 
Courts reviewing committees’ compliance with section 5’s 
fair balance requirement123 are generally deferential to agen-
cies’ determinations that a committee is fairly balanced to per-
                                                          
S. REP. NO. 92-1098 (1972) and H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972)). The Senate Re-
port states that section 5 “require[s] that membership of the advisory commit-
tee shall be representative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of 
such committee.” S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 9. 
 119. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 120. A well-established canon of statutory construction provides that “[a] 
term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same 
way each time it appears.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994). 
 121. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2). 
 122. Indeed, Congress explicitly contemplated this balance of “multiple 
perspectives” when enacting the 1997 FACA amendments. See supra note 95 
and accompanying text. 
 123. Some courts have found this to be a nonjusticiable, political question. 
See, e.g., Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 945–47 (9th Cir. 2008); Sanchez v. 
Pena, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238 (D.N.M. 1998). However, most courts have 
held it to be justiciable. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 
334–36 (5th Cir. 1999); Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiologi-
cal Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, at *3–4 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 9, 1999). Additionally, litigants often encounter problems with ful-
filling the standing requirements. See, e.g., Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal., 711 F.2d 
at 1073–74 (stating that “[t]he standing question is a close one,” but ultimate-
ly agreeing that the litigants had standing); Metcalf v. Nat’l Petroleum Coun-
cil, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying standing); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 
1999 WL 33526001, at *2–3 (finding that litigants had standing). 
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form its functions.124 However, on occasion, courts have been 
willing to find that the committees are not fairly balanced and 
have enjoined the use of such committees.125 The examination 
has two prongs: First, what is the committee’s function?126 Se-
cond, is additional balance needed to fulfill those functions? 
Where the functions to be performed are “narrow and ex-
plicit,”127 less representation on the committee may be re-
quired. For example, in Cargill, Inc. v. United States, the com-
mittee’s function was to peer-review a scientific study protocol 
for examining the health effects of diesel exhaust exposure on 
underground miners.128 Because the committee only needed 
“expertise in the scientific method” in order to fulfill its func-
tions, it was sufficient that the committee contained only scien-
tists and statisticians and not individuals with an “in-depth 
knowledge of diesel processes.”129 Furthermore, because the 
committee’s task of “providing scientific peer review” was “polit-
ically neutral and technocratic,” the court found that there was 
no need for mine managers to be represented on the commit-
tee.130 The committee was not called upon to make policy deci-
sions or provide regulatory advice, so broader representation 
was unnecessary.131 
Similarly, in Public Citizen v. National Advisory Commit-
tee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,132 the committee at 
issue was tasked with providing “advice and recommendations 
on the development of microbiological criteria for foods.”133 Pub-
lic Citizen, moving for a preliminary injunction, argued that 
there was no fair balance because there were many food indus-
                                                          
 124. See, e.g., Cargill, 173 F.3d at 334 (explaining that the functional bal-
ance requirement is “subject to a deferential standard of review”). 
 125. See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep’t of Interior, 26 F.3d 
1103 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding an injunction where a committee tasked with 
deciding whether to list a particular species of fish as endangered did not in-
clude any representatives who had an economic interest in that fish market). 
 126. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 336 (“In considering whether a committee is fairly 
balanced in terms of function, courts naturally have looked first at the func-
tions to be performed.”). 
 127. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal., 711 F.2d at 1074. 
 128. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 323. 
 129. Id. at 336–37 (emphasis omitted). 
 130. Id. at 337. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for 
Foods, 708 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1988). 
 133. Id. at 360. 
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try-related committee members but no consumer representa-
tives or advocates on the committee.134 The court, however, 
found that because the committee was “charged with a highly 
technical mandate which requires extensive scientific back-
ground as well as expertise in processing and distribution prac-
tices,” no consumer advocates were necessary to provide fair 
balance for the committee’s particular function.135 Not “every 
interested party or group affected” is entitled to representation, 
only those required for the committee to fulfill its function.136 
However, the court noted that had the committee’s purpose 
been “to study the effects of a particular type of regulation of 
microbiological criteria on the public, then the results might be 
different.”137 
When the committee is responsible for making broad sub-
stantive policy recommendations, however, much greater rep-
resentation is required. For example, in National Anti-Hunger 
Coalition, the committee at issue originally had the narrow 
function of “apply[ing] private sector expertise to attain cost-
effective management in the federal government.”138 Even 
though the committee only included corporate executives and 
no public interest representatives, the court initially found that 
it was fairly balanced given its specific function of addressing 
“fiscal management of large private organizations.”139 However, 
later evidence revealed that the committee, in fact, made rec-
ommendations not concerning cost-control but instead concern-
ing broad policy issues and possible repeal of existing legisla-
tion.140 Specifically, the court was concerned because the 
committee’s recommendations altered the established rights of 
those who might be affected, and those people were not repre-
sented on the committee.141 Because the committee addressed 
“areas of general national import,” the court found the commit-
tee unbalanced and illegal.142 
                                                          
 134. Id. at 361–62. 
 135. Id. at 363. 
 136. Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Reagan, Civ. A. No. 88-
186, 1988 WL 21700 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1988)). 
 137. Id. at 364. 
 138. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1516–17 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 141. Id. at 1517. 
 142. Id. 
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In Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative,143 the court in determining whether two com-
mittees were fairly balanced under FACA stated that “[t]he 
proper question, simply put, is whether the [committee]s per-
form functions that are so ‘narrow and explicit’ that fair bal-
ance among competing viewpoints is irrelevant.”144 The com-
mittees at issue provided trade and industrial 
recommendations regarding forest products.145 These commit-
tees’ advice “affect[ed] the environment nationally and interna-
tionally.”146 The plaintiffs, environmentalist organizations, 
sought representation on the committees because they had a 
“direct interest in the advice given by the [committees].”147 The 
court found that the committees’ functions could not “be char-
acterized as ‘politically neutral and technocratic,’” but that the 
committees “offer[ed] advice on diverse and far-reaching issues 
that affect others.”148 Thus, broad representation was required 
on these committees, especially representation by environmen-
talists, whose interests were likely to be affected.149 The court 
found these committees to be unbalanced.150 
In conclusion, upon examining the case law under FACA 
section 5, a committee whose functions are narrow, scientific, or 
technical does not require as broad representation as a commit-
tee whose functions extend to broader policy matters. A com-
mittee tasked with addressing broad policy, regulatory, and 
legislative matters that affect others and are of “general na-
tional import” requires broad representation. Specifically, those 
key stakeholders most likely to be affected by the committee’s 
recommendations are entitled to representation on that com-
mittee. 
  
                                                          
 143. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999). 
 144. Id. at *5. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at *3. 
 148. Id. at *7. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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IV. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES’ SELECTION AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMITTEES 
IOM committees are not only governed by statute—they 
are also governed by the National Academies’ own internal pol-
icies regarding member selection, balance, conflicts of interest, 
and bias. 
A. SELECTION AND OPERATION OF COMMITTEES 
National Academies’ staff initiates the search for commit-
tee candidates, permitting consultations and suggestions from 
outside groups and authorities.151 After review, the chair of the 
National Research Council, who also serves as the president of 
NAS, appoints members to the committee.152 Once appointed, 
members are required to “list all professional, consulting, and 
financial connections, as well as to describe pertinent intellec-
tual positions and public statements.”153 However, most of this 
information remains confidential.154 Only members’ names, af-
filiations, and short biographies are posted online for public 
comment.155 During the first committee meeting, members dis-
cuss the confidential information in a closed session.156 At this 
meeting, changes to the committee’s composition are proposed 
and finalized.157 Final decision-making authority regarding 
committee balance and conflicts of interest rests with the chair 
of the National Research Council Executive Office and the 
General Counsel’s Office.158 
Once committee membership is established, the committee 
                                                          
 151. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 6. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. This is a requirement under FACA. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §15(b)(1) 
(2006). It is questionable whether these brief biographies really provide 
enough information upon which the public can meaningfully comment because 
they may omit information indicating possible conflicts of interest. It may be 
more appropriate, given the statute’s spirit of disclosure, to publicly provide 
committee members’ full curriculum vitaes or other detailed background and 
personal information. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 156. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 7. 
 157. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., http://www8.national 
academies.org/cp/information.aspx?key=Committee_Appointment (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2011). 
 158. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, 
at 8. 
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holds open data-gathering meetings, which the Academies de-
fines as “any meeting of a committee at which anyone other 
than committee members or officials, agents, or employees of 
the institution is present.”159 Written materials provided by 
these outside individuals are made publicly accessible.160 
Committees then deliberate in closed meetings when develop-
ing findings and drafting recommendations.161 The public is on-
ly provided with a brief summary of these meetings,162 and 
“[a]ll analyses and drafts of the report remain confidential.”163 
The report itself remains confidential until it passes through 
independent review by other experts appointed by the National 
Academies.164 Once the review process is complete and appro-
priate Academies officials have signed off on the final report, 
only then is it released to the public.165 The public has no op-
portunity to suggest changes or address concerns—the report is 
final.166 
                                                          
 159. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 12. 
 160. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68. While NAS offi-
cially makes the data publicly accessible, the ease of this accessibility is de-
batable. In February 2011, both authors of this Article independently inquired 
about the material available from the IOM 510(k) Committee and have re-
ceived no response or information as of the date of publication. 
 161. Id.; NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 10. 
 162. Use of the word “brief” may be an understatement here. FACA section 
15(b)(4) requires that “brief summar[ies]” of closed meetings be made publicly 
available. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(4) (2006). The summary must “identify the 
committee members present, the topics discussed, materials made available to 
the committee, and other such matters that the Academy determines should 
be included.” Id. The IOM 510(k) committee has provided only this bare mini-
mum information for each of its seven closed meetings, at no point including 
any “other such matters.” See Nat’l Acads., Project Information, CURRENT 
PROJECTS SYS., http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview 
.aspx?key=IOM-BGH-10-05 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (listing each committee 
meeting and providing links to the summaries) (website since removed). This 
minimal provision of information is not unique to IOM’s 510(k) committee. 
See, e.g., Nat’l Acads., Meeting Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS., 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/meetingview.aspx?MeetingID=5391&M
eetingNo=3 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (providing a brief summary of a closed 
meeting of the IOM’s Strengthening Core Elements of Regulatory Systems in 
Developing Countries Committee including only the minimum required infor-
mation) (website since removed). 
 163. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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B. COMMITTEE BALANCE, BIAS, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The National Academies recognizes the importance of 
achieving fair balance—not only balance in perspectives, but 
balance in knowledge and expertise. “[I]f a report is to be . . . 
effective . . . ,[it] must be, and must be perceived to be, not only 
highly competent but also the result of a process that is fairly 
balanced in terms of the knowledge, expertise, and perspectives 
utilized to produce it . . . .”167 Even fully competent committees 
may be ineffective if “undermined by allegations of conflict of 
interest or lack of balance and objectivity.”168 Furthermore, 
whether a committee is appropriately balanced depends heavily 
upon the specific tasks with which that committee is charged—
“a committee that is well-balanced for one purpose may not be 
appropriately constructed for a modified task.”169 Therefore, the 
National Academies requires that its committees meet two cri-
teria—they must contain an “appropriate range of expertise for 
the task” and must also contain a “balance of perspectives.”170 
This echoes, albeit with more detail, the “fair balance” re-
quirements of FACA. 
First, the Academies requires that its committees “include 
experts with the specific expertise and experience needed to 
address the study’s statement of task.”171 It is not enough that 
committee members be highly qualified in terms of knowledge, 
training, and experience—“[i]t is also essential that the 
knowledge, experience, and perspectives of potential committee 
members be thoughtfully and carefully assessed and balanced 
in terms of the subtleties and complexities of the particular sci-
entific, technical, and other issues to be addressed and the 
functions to be performed by the committee.”172 “[T]he signifi-
cant omission of any required discipline from the committee 
might seriously compromise the quality of the committee’s 
analysis and judgments, even though it is clear to all that the 
committee is composed of highly qualified and distinguished 
                                                          
 167. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, 
at 1. 
 168. Id. 
 169. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 5. 
 170. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157. 
 171. Id. 
 172. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, 
at 3. 
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Second, committees must have point-of-view balance, or a 
“balance of perspectives.” Relevant points-of-view must be bal-
anced “so that the committee can carry out its charge objective-
ly and credibly.”174 Without this balance, allegations of bias 
may undermine the committee’s work, regardless of its quality 
or competence.175 When a committee is otherwise composed of 
highly qualified experts, but is lacking balance, “the usual pro-
cedure is to add members to the committee to achieve the ap-
propriate balance.”176 
Importantly, committee members are permitted, even ex-
pected, to have a particular point-of-view on a relevant issue.177 
These personal opinions, biases, or perspectives are not consid-
ered disqualifying conflicts of interest.178 Members may serve 
on the committee even though they are “committed to a fixed 
position on a particular issue” through public statements, pub-
lications, or by closely identifying or affiliating with particular 
interest groups.179 These biases, while not necessarily disquali-
fying, must be balanced. 
In fact, the National Academies recognizes that sometimes 
member bias is actually necessary “to ensure that a committee 
is fully competent.”180 Some studies require particular perspec-
tives despite potential bias or conflicts of interest. For example, 
the Academies’ official Policy on Committee Composition and 
Balance and Conflicts of Interest explains that “it may be im-
portant to have an ‘industrial’ perspective or an ‘environmental’ 
perspective” because “such individuals, through their particular 
knowledge and experience, are often vital to achieving an in-
formed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and 
analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to be 
                                                          
 173. Id. 
 174. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157. 
 175. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 6 (“The credibility of a report can be called into question if the 
committee that produced it is perceived to be biased.”). 
 176. Id. at 7.  
 177. Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157 (“Committee mem-
bers are expected to have points of view . . . .”). 
 178. See NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 
103, at 5. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 3. 
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considered by the committee.”181 Thus, potentially biasing 
backgrounds are acceptable, or even desirable, as long as they 
are balanced by countervailing perspectives on the committee. 
Conflicts of interest are different from points-of-view. The 
Academies defines a “conflict of interest” as “any financial or 
other interest which conflicts with the service of the individual 
because it (1) could significantly impair the individual’s objec-
tivity or (2) could create an unfair competitive advantage for 
any person or organization.”182 Only current interests are con-
sidered conflicts, not past or possible future interests.183 Con-
flicts of interest are usually, but not always, financial.184 When 
individuals are appointed to a committee, they undergo a rigor-
ous conflict of interest review.185 Generally, individuals with 
conflicts of interest may not serve on committees because it 
could cause others to “reasonably question, and perhaps dis-
count or dismiss, the work of the committee.”186 
However, in some situations, the Academies may deter-
mine that a conflict of interest is unavoidable; in which case, it 
must promptly and publicly disclose the conflict.187 For exam-
ple, the conflict may be unavoidable if “the individual’s qualifi-
cations, knowledge, and experience are particularly valuable to 
the work of the committee and if the institution is unable to 
identify another individual with comparable qualifications, 
knowledge, and experience who does not also have a conflict of 
interest.”188 
The National Academies states that unavoidable conflicts 
only arise in “rare situations”189 or “exceptional circumstanc-
es,”190 but a brief review of past IOM committees illustrates 
that this situation is not so “rare” or “exceptional.” A search on 
                                                          
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 4. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157. 
 186. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, 
at 4. 
 187. This is required both by FACA and the National Academies’ own poli-
cies. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006); Committee Appointment Process, su-
pra note 157. 
 188. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, 
at 8. 
 189. Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157. 
 190. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 7. 
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the IOM’s website for current or recent FDA-sponsored IOM 
committees revealed ten such committees, at least half of which 
contained members with industry background and at least 
three committees involved disclosed conflicts of interest.191 For 
example, the IOM committee on Qualification of Biomarkers 
and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic Disease includes a Vice 
President at Merck & Co.192 The IOM concluded that this com-
mittee required “at least one person who has extensive current 
knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry’s involvement with 
efforts to define biomarker qualification strategies.”193 Thus, 
despite this individual’s position at Merck, a large pharmaceu-
tical company that engages in drug discovery and development, 
his membership was desirable because of his expertise and ex-
perience.194 This committee also included another individual 
who had a conflict of interest because he “owns a consulting 
company through which he serves as a consultant to companies 
in the diagnostic, medical instruments and pharmaceutical in-
dustries.”195 His membership was necessary because of his “ex-
pertise in clinical chemistry.”196 
The IOM committee on Accelerating Rare Diseases Re-
search and Orphan Product Development was asked to evalu-
ate strategies “to promote research discoveries and develop-
ment of orphan products to improve the health of people with 
rare diseases.”197 This committee evaluated public policies and 
legislative and regulatory initiatives relevant to product devel-
opment for rare diseases.198 This task is strikingly similar to 
the 510(k) Committee’s charge of evaluating innovation. Here, 
                                                          
 191. See About Activities, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities.aspx 
?search=%22food%20and%20drug%20administration%22 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2011) (Disclosures of committee member conflicts of interest are only available 
for current projects, but not recently completed projects, so the total number of 
recent committees involving disclosed conflicts of interest may have in fact 
been greater than the three retrieved through this search.). 
 192. Nat’l Acads., Committee Membership Information, CURRENT PROJECTS 
SYS., http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49028 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Activity: Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product 
Development, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Research/ 
OrphanProductResearch.aspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2011). 
 198. Id. 
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the IOM determined that the committee must include “someone 
with expertise and experience in the medical devices industry 
to help the committee examine factors affecting product devel-
opment decisions by companies and assess options for acceler-
ating research and development in the area of rare condi-
tions.”199 Therefore, the IOM included on this committee a 
former Vice President of Medtronic, Inc.,200 who also owned 
stock and was a consultant to Medtronic, despite his conflict of 
interest.201 His conflict of interest was thus “unavoidable” pre-
cisely because his “extensive experience and expertise in prod-
uct research and development in the medical device industry” 
was considered necessary for the committee to accomplish its 
task.202 This same committee also included an individual who 
was a former Senior Vice President of Pfizer, Inc., owned stock 
and stock options in Pfizer, and who was also a “partner in a 
private equity firm focused on drug development programs.”203 
This individual was required on the committee because of his 
“expert knowledge of drug discovery and development in the 
pharmaceutical industry.”204 Finally, this committee of fourteen 
people included a third member with a conflict of interest, an 
individual who consults with pharmaceutical, medical device, 
and biologics companies, because of her “direct experience with 
the administration of the FDA orphan product development 
program.”205 
The IOM committee on Review of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s Role in Ensuring Safe Food reviewed gaps in 
public health protection in the farm-to-table food safety system 
and made legislative, regulatory, and administrative recom-
mendations.206 Two members of this committee had disclosed 
                                                          
 199. COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RESEARCH AND ORPHAN 
PROD. DEV., INST. MED., RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: 
ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. 
Boat eds. 2010) [hereinafter RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS], availa-
ble at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49099 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
 200. Id. at 388.Medtronic manufactures medical devices, including devices 
used in treating certain rare conditions. Id. at 222. 
 201. Id. at 388. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring Safe 
Food, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Nutrition/FDARoleRev 
iew.aspx (last updated Sept. 14, 2010). 
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conflicts of interest. First, the Senior Vice President and Chief 
Scientific and Regulatory Affairs Officer of the Grocery Manu-
facturers Association207 was permitted on the committee be-
cause of his “current knowledge of the regulatory and scientific 
activities and perspectives of the food industry.”208 He was ap-
pointed to this committee precisely because of his “current, in-
depth knowledge of industry activities and perspectives.”209 The 
second member was an expert in the field of risk analysis and 
chemical risk assessment, who was appointed to the committee 
despite his role in a consulting firm that performs risk assess-
ments for food industry clients and “whose financial interests 
could be affected by the outcome of the committee’s study.”210 
Clearly, individuals with conflicts of interest are frequently 
deemed valuable and necessary for IOM committees to fulfill 
their functions. In fact, it is often the source of these conflicts of 
interest—the individuals’ experience and connections with the 
industries involved—that makes their membership on the 
committee essential. Thus, these conflicts are considered “una-
voidable.” At least three out of ten FDA-sponsored IOM com-
mittees contain members with such conflicts of interest. One 
can hardly view that as “exceptional” or “rare.” 
V. IOM’S 510(K) COMMITTEE 
The IOM’s 510(k) Committee must be fairly balanced in 
order to properly perform its functions. It must include all es-
sential areas of expertise, balance the biases and perspectives 
of its members, and disclose any unavoidable conflicts of inter-
est. A failure to achieve this balance violates both FACA sec-
tion 15 as well as the National Academies’ own policies and re-
quirements.211 
The 510(k) Committee was originally asked to assess two 
                                                          
 207. The Grocery Manufacturers Association is “a trade association that 
represents food, beverage and consumer products companies whose interest 
might be affected by the committee recommendations.” Nat’l Acads., Commit-
tee Membership Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS., http://www8.national 
academies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49032 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
 208. Id. (emphasis added). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (2006); Committee Appointment Process, supra 
note 157. 
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critical questions: 1) whether “the current 510(k) process opti-
mally protects patients” and 2) whether it “promote[s] innova-
tion in support of public health.”212 If the committee found that 
the 510(k) system did not protect patients or promote innova-
tion, it was asked to recommend any legislative, regulatory, or 
administrative changes that would be necessary to achieve the-
se goals.213 In January 2011, the 510(k) Committee was also re-
ferred seven specific issues to consider.214 These issues covered 
a broad range of controversial issues, including the FDA’s au-
thority to fully or partially rescind a 510(k) clearance, clarifica-
tion as to when a device should no longer be available for use as 
a predicate, establishment of a new Class IIb device category, 
whether the FDA should consider off-label use when determin-
ing a device’s “intended use,” requiring each 510(k) submitter 
to keep at least one unit of the device under review available 
for the CDRH to access upon request, authorities and require-
ments for post-market surveillance studies, and clarification 
and consolidation of the terms “indication for use” and “intend-
ed use.”215 Therefore, the committee’s composition must be bal-
anced not only for the initial broad system-wide and policy is-
sues, but also for the additional specific issues it was later 
asked to address.216 
The 510(k) Committee has twelve members, consisting of 
five physicians, three lawyers, and a number of talented aca-
demics with a variety of technical backgrounds.217 Overall, the 
committee includes members with a wide range of educational 
and professional experiences. Each of the individuals on the 
committee is highly qualified and impressive, and this Article 
does not question their expertise or competence. However, 
there are some critical absences on this committee. Notably, 
the committee does not include: 
  
                                                          
 212. Activity: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Pro-
cess, INST. MED, supra note 18. 
 213. Id. 
 214. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6; Press Release, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 63. 
 215. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 3, at 2, 11–13, 16–19; FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6. 
 216. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 5 (“[A] committee that is well-balanced for one purpose may not be 
appropriately constructed for a modified task.”). 
 217. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 279–
86. 
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• Inventors and innovators who have created new device products 
under current FDA systems;218 
• product developers who have brought products from concept to 
market through the FDA approval processes; 
• entrepreneurs; 
• venture capitalists, investment bankers, or angel investors with ex-
perience financing new medical device innovation; 
• individuals who routinely prepare 510(k) applications; 
management or other professionals from the medical device indus-
try; or 
• patients or patient advocates. 
The FDA acknowledged some of these omissions in a recent 
hearing before Congress. Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, the Director of the 
FDA’s CDRH, admitted that the IOM committee does not in-
clude any innovators or inventors, entrepreneurs or investment 
and venture capital experts, or patients or patient group repre-
sentatives.219 The FDA later amended these answers, identify-
                                                          
 218. One committee member, Dr. Lazar Greenfield, is credited with invent-
ing the Greenfield vena cava filter. See id. at 280. However, this invention was 
introduced in 1973, before there was separate regulation of medical devices by 
the FDA. See Ken Garber, The Clot Stopper, 22 INVENTION & TECH. MAG., 
Summer 2006, at 35, 36 (describing the invention of the Kimray-Greenfield 
filter in the early 1970s and stating that “at the time, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration did not have to approve medical devices”). The Medical Device 
Amendments creating the initial device regulatory system did not become law 
until 1976. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 
539 (1976). The modern 510(k) system did not start to take shape until the 
Safe Medical Device Amendments of 1990. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990). There have been major subsequent 
changes to the statutory system for medical device regulation, most notably in 
1997 and 2007. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007); Food and Drug Administration Mod-
ernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997). Of course, 
there has been a constant parade of new regulations, guidance documents, and 
policies in the last 20 years. See Overview of Device Regulation, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
Overview/default.htm (last updated Aug. 31, 2009) (providing information 
about many of the statutes, regulations and guidance concerning medical de-
vices). The subsequent major changes to the Greenfield filter occurred after 
Boston Scientific acquired the device—and although Dr. Greenfield made sug-
gestions to improve the filter’s design, it was Boston Scientific that navigated 
the FDA’s regulatory process. Cf. Ken Garber, supra note 218, at 39 (describ-
ing the company’s subsequent changes to the filter). 
 219. Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
112th Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, Director, Food & Drug 
Admin. Center for Devices and Radiological Health), available at 
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ing two committee members as “inventors” or “innovators.”220 
However, these individuals did not contribute to the creation of 
new devices under current FDA systems,221 so their contribu-
tions to this committee as “inventors” and “innovators” are se-
verely limited and not particularly relevant.222 Without current 
and relevant experiences and perspectives on the committee, it 
is hardly “fairly balanced” to answer broad policy questions in-
volving patient safety and innovation and is also not fairly bal-
anced to adequately address the seven additional questions 
posed to it. 
A. THE COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF EXPERTISE TO ADDRESS 
SAFETY 
The 510(k) Committee must include expertise to address 
both safety and innovation issues. Patient safety is undoubted-
ly a broad, public issue involving policy and regulatory recom-
mendations and affecting the public at large. It is a complex, 
multi-factorial issue requiring consideration of not only manu-
facturing controls, device design, and other industry-related 
factors, but also patient access, autonomy, and acceptable risk. 
It is not a “narrow and explicit” function,223 nor is it “politically 
                                                          
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/ 
Transcript_MedDevice.pdf. The FDA later justified these absences by saying 
that such individuals would have a conflict of interest and would thus be ineli-
gible to serve on the committee; however, IOM’s past practices undermine this 
justification. See Letter from Jeanne Ireland, Assistant Comm’r for Legisla-
tion, Food & Drug Admin., to Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Health, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Apr. 12, 2011) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Letter from Jeanne Ireland] (justifying the lack of these various 
individuals on the committee). 
 220. See Letter from Jeanne Ireland, supra note 219, at 15 (identifying Dr. 
Lazar Greenfield and Dr. Gary Dorfman as the committee’s only inventors and 
innovators). 
 221. As explained above, Dr. Greenfield’s experience as an inventor or in-
novator predates any current FDA regulatory schemes. See supra note 218. 
Dr. Dorfman, who “holds several patents related to medical devices,” may 
qualify as an “inventor”; however, his most recent patent was filed in 2002, 
Letter from Jeanne Ireland, supra note 219, at 15. See U.S. Patent No. 
6,736,842 (filed July 24, 2002). He does not qualify as an “innovator” because 
innovation requires more than mere abstract conceptualization and patent-
filing. See infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text (describing innovation 
as the transformation of an invention into a helpful commercial product). 
 222. This Article only argues that these individuals’ experience is insuffi-
cient to meet the specific requirements of this particular committee—it in no 
way intends to diminish their professional qualifications, knowledge, experi-
ence, and contributions. 
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neutral and technocratic.”224 Rather, the safety of all patients 
in this country is an issue that most certainly affects “areas of 
general national import”225 and involves “diverse and far-
reaching issues.”226 As previously discussed, where committees 
are called upon to make policy decisions or provide regulatory 
advice, broad representation is necessary.227 More diverse rep-
resentation may also be necessary when the committee’s pur-
pose is “to study the effects of a particular type of regulation . . . 
on the public.”228 Therefore, following the reasoning the courts 
have applied under FACA section 5, the 510(k) system’s protec-
tion of public safety is an issue requiring diverse committee 
representation. 
Those who invent, design, develop, manufacture, finance, 
and test medical devices have much-needed expertise in how to 
ensure the safety of those devices. In fact, they are legally re-
quired to design, research, test, manufacture, and support the 
product in a safe manner.229 They offer valuable perspectives 
on the types of research systems, manufacturing controls, test-
ing strategies, and design processes that are needed to enhance 
patient safety.230 Through their experience, they are familiar 
                                                          
 223. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 224. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 225. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1517 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 226. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999). 
 227. Cf. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 337 (finding broad representation unnecessary 
because the committee was not called upon to make policy or regulatory deci-
sions). 
 228. Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for 
Foods, 708 F. Supp. 359, 364 (D.D.C. 1988). 
 229. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006) (conditioning premarket approval 
on a “showing of reasonable assurance” that the device is safe as well as an 
examination of the manufacturing, processing, packing, installation methods, 
facilities and controls, as well as device performance); id. § 351(a)–(d) (2006) 
(defining when a device is “adulterated” and making it illegal to ship such a 
device); 21 C.F.R. § 814.2 (2011) (requiring approved devices to be safe and 
effective); id. § 820.1 (establishing quality system regulations to ensure that 
finished devices are safe). 
 230. See Josh Makower, Consulting Associate Professor of Medicine, Stan-
ford University, The Structure of the MedTech Innovation Ecosystem (June 
14, 2010), in PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION—WORKSHOP 
REPORT, 18 (2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity 
%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/2010-JUN-14/Presentations/14%20Mak 
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with how the FDA’s regulatory process affects these factors. 
These stakeholders are responsible for all new devices market-
ed in the United States, and it is their experience and work 
that greatly affects the safety of patients throughout the na-
tion. Yet the committee lacks this expertise. Without at least 
some of these individuals on the committee, it cannot adequate-
ly evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient safety and 
make practical, helpful recommendations as to how to improve 
it. 
B. THE 510(K) COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF EXPERTISE TO 
ADDRESS INNOVATION 
Innovation is more than just invention. Invention is simply 
the embodiment of a new idea. It “generates new ideas, patents, 
prototypes, designs, breakthrough experiments, and working 
models.”231 Innovation, however, is the transformation of an 
idea or invention into a commercial product for the betterment 
of society.232 It is the identification of a need and the develop-
ment of a service or product to meet that need.233 Innovation is 
responsible for an invention’s acceptance in society, as well as 
its profitability and value.234 Thus, innovation encompasses 
more than just invention—it includes the entire cycle, from in-
vention, research and development, manufacturing, and mar-
keting, to the ultimate value realization in society.235 Invention  
  
                                                          
ower.pdf (explaining that good quality systems, beginning with design devel-
opment and control, and continuing through manufacturing and post market 
surveillance, are primarily responsible for patient safety). 
 231. Thomas D. Kuczmarski, Innovation Always Trumps Invention, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.business 
week.com/innovate/content/jan2011/id20110114_286049.htm. 
 232. Id. (explaining that innovation “transforms these inventions into 
commercial products, services, and businesses”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See Larry Dignan, The Difference Between Innovation and Invention, 
ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2007, 9:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/the-difference-
between-innovation-and-invention/4610; see also William Buxton, Innovation 
vs. Invention, ROTMAN MAG., Fall 2005, at 52, 52 (“[I]nnovation is far more 
about prospecting, mining, refining and adding value . . . than it is about pure 
invention.”); Makower, supra note 230 (identifying the parts of the medical 
technology innovation system, including “fuelers” such as venture capitalists, 
investors, and public markets, “innovation catalysts” such as small start-ups, 
large companies, incubators, and other inventors and entrepreneurs, “consum-
ers” such as patients, physicians, and hospitals, and “regulators” such as FDA, 
CMS, third party payers, and professional societies). 
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is possible without innovation, and innovation does not neces-
sarily require invention.236 
To assess the 510(k) system’s promotion of innovation, the 
committee must include more than lawyers, doctors, and aca-
demics. It must include more than inventors or patent-holders. 
The IOM’s charge requires an appreciation of how regulation 
impacts the complex innovation ecosystem. It requires an un-
derstanding of innovation, finance, entrepreneurship, product 
development, manufacturing, and regulatory process. At least 
some 510(k) Committee members must have this knowledge. 
They must have experience in transforming inventions into 
commercial products and bringing value to society through the-
se new products. Ideally, the Committee should include people 
who have worked within the current 510(k) framework when 
they have conceptualized devices, designed and developed those 
devices, obtained financing for new product lines, manufac-
tured those devices, and successfully brought them to market. 
Essentially, the committee needs entrepreneurs and those who 
have recently been involved in the medical device industry for 
their experience and insights into the current 510(k) system’s 
effect on innovation. Unfortunately, the committee lacks this 
expertise. 
The FDA has even acknowledged the crucial role industry 
plays in innovation. In a recent presentation made to the an-
nual meeting of the Food and Drug Law Institute, the Director 
of CDRH stated: “U.S. medical device development is an ecosys-
tem with shared responsibilities—to remain healthy it needs a 
strong device industry, a strong U.S. research system, and a 
strong FDA.”237 Thus, CDRH reconfirmed and explicitly recog-
nized the vital role of industry in medical device innovation. 
This is precisely one of those situations in which it is crucial to 
have an “industrial” perspective to achieve an “informed, com-
prehensive, and authoritative understanding and analysis of 
the specific problems and potential solutions to be considered 
by the committee.”238 After all, it is industry that designs, tests, 
                                                          
 236. See Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innova-
tion, and Technological Change, 73 Q.J. ECON. 596, 597 (1959) (describing the 
distinction between innovation and invention). 
 237. Jeffrey Shuren, Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, 2011: The 
State of CDRH (Apr. 6, 2011) (on file with author). 
 238. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, 
at 3. 
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develops, and makes the regulatory submissions for essentially 
all medical devices marketed in the United States. 
While the current 510(k) Committee includes highly quali-
fied, intelligent, and experienced members, individuals with 
the critical expertise in innovation, manufacturing, entrepre-
neurship, device development, financing, and marketing are 
conspicuously absent. Each current committee member is indi-
vidually impressive and has expertise worthy of inclusion on 
the committee, but without this broader membership, the 
committee is inadequate to fulfill its mission. Thus, this com-
mittee is not fairly balanced to perform its functions and fails 
to satisfy FACA section 15 as well as the National Academies’ 
own policies on committee composition. 
C. THE 510(K) COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE TO ADDRESS 
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 
In addition to the general issues of patient safety and in-
novation, the IOM 510(k) Committee was also asked to address 
seven specific issues, as explained above.239 Without an indus-
try member on the committee, it is not fairly balanced to tackle 
these additional questions. For example, the committee was 
asked to “consider defining the scope and grounds for the exer-
cise of the Center’s authority to fully or partially rescind a 
510(k) clearance.”240 Recommendations as to rescinding 510(k) 
clearances may alter the established rights of those who might 
be affected241 (i.e. medical device companies who are currently 
marketing products cleared through the 510(k) process), and 
thus those interests must be represented on the committee. 
As another example, the 510(k) Committee was also asked 
to “consider the possibility of requiring each 510(k) submitter to 
keep at least one unit of the device under review available for 
CDRH to access upon request.”242 This has enormous practical 
implications for medical device companies—storage and ware-
housing of functional devices such as large magnetic resonance 
                                                          
 239. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 3, at 2, 11–13, 16–19; FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6. 
 240. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6. 
 241. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1516–17 (D.D.C. 1983) 
(“[T]hese three policy recommendations are substantive in character because 
they affect established statutory rights of those presently eligible for various 
types of ‘hunger’ benefits.”). 
 242. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 7, at 6. 
3 STENSVAD HALL FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 12:48 PM 
112 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
imaging machines and other imaging devices, as well as com-
plicated and sensitive electronics such as surgical robots, is not 
only expensive, but requires large amounts of real estate and 
the creation of specially-designed warehouses that can accom-
modate the specific weight, chemical, and temperature re-
quirements of these devices.243 Device installation and calibra-
tion also presents significant burdens to industry.244 Medical 
device companies have essential insight as to the practicability, 
or even possibility, of this new requirement. They also offer 
valuable perspectives on the benefits (or lack thereof) that such 
a requirement may have in complaint investigation and correc-
tive action for problematic devices.245 Theoretically it might be 
a great idea to keep one of each device ready for inspection at 
all times, but there are practical limitations that only those in-
volved in the industry may be likely to consider. 
Although this Article only discusses two of the seven addi-
tional issues, each of the seven questions posed to the 510(k) 
Committee could benefit from, or even requires, the perspective 
of an industry member on the committee. Therefore, even if the 
committee were fairly balanced for its original functions, it is 
not fairly balanced for these additional tasks. 
D. THE COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF PERSPECTIVES 
IOM committees must also be balanced with respect to the 
perspectives and biases of the committee members. While not 
explicitly required by FACA,246 this is an explicit requirement 
according to the National Academies’ own policies.247 As previ-
ously noted, IOM committees can include individuals with 
preexisting biases, since most biases are not conflicts of inter-
est, providing that there are countervailing viewpoints on the 
committee.248 Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not in-
clude a balance of viewpoints. 
For instance, one committee member spent almost twenty 
                                                          
 243. See id. 
 244. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 3, at 17. 
 245. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2010) (discussing corrective and preventative 
action regarding medical devices). 
 246. But as noted earlier, this is an implicit requirement when a lack of 
objectivity compromises the ability of the committee to fulfill its function. 
 247. See supra notes 170, 174–176 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text. 
3 STENSVAD HALL FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 12:48 PM 
2012] LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES 113 
years at the national public interest law firm Public Citizen 
Litigation Group, whose motto is “Defending democracy. Resist-
ing corporate power.”249 Public Citizen’s goal is to “defend[] de-
mocracy from corporate greed.”250 The organization is highly 
critical of the 510(k) process, asserting that medical devices are 
approved too quickly so that “dangerous or deadly devices enter 
the market.”251 In fact, the Director of Public Citizen’s Health 
Research Group criticized the FDA’s deferral to the IOM, stat-
ing that “the FDA is not being forceful enough about improving 
the safety and effectiveness of new devices” and is “yield[ing]” 
to innovation.252 While this individual’s participation and view-
point is certainly appropriate on the committee, there is no ap-
parent counterweight—the committee actually requires an ex-
plicit pro-industry viewpoint to achieve balance. 
Thus, the 510(k) Committee is unbalanced with respect to 
points-of-view as well as expertise. This imbalance in perspec-
tives subjects the committee to the risk of actual bias, or at 
least the perception of bias, which may undermine the commit-
tee’s hard work, regardless of the accuracy of its final report. 
E. THE COMMITTEE NEEDS PATIENTS OR PATIENT ADVOCATES 
It is also critical that the patient—the ultimate stakehold-
er—is not represented on the committee. The charge to the 
committee requires balancing risk (i.e., the protection of pa-
tients) with innovation (i.e., getting patients faster and more 
economical access to innovative new products). This balancing 
process raises politically significant questions of patient auton-
                                                          
 249. PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 250. See Device Approval Process, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/dev 
iceapprovalprocess (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 251. See, e.g., Jonas Zajac Hines et al., Left to Their Own Devices: Break-
downs in United States Medical Device Premarket Review, PLOS MED., July 
2010, at 3–4, 6, available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/ in-
fo%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000280 (harshly critiquing the 510(k) 
process, and acknowledging Brian Wolfman, a current IOM committee mem-
ber, for his assistance on the article); see also Device and Diagnostic Policy, 
PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2505 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2011) (explaining that medical devices are “often approved quickly and inap-
propriately,” causing “dangerous and even deadly devices [to] enter the mar-
ket”). 
 252. Press Release, Sidney Wolfe, Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Research 
Grp., FDA Dodges Responsibility Regarding Medical Device Approval, Defers 
to IOM (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/ 
pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3261. 
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omy, beneficence, and medical ethics.253 When should the pa-
tient have the right to some particular device despite known 
risks? Under what circumstances should the FDA intervene 
and make that decision for the patient by barring access to the 
device? The FDA charged the 510(k) Committee with determin-
ing the “optimal” balance between these factors.254 
Any adequate evaluation of patient safety requires a pa-
tient or patient advocate’s viewpoint and expertise. What con-
stitutes an unacceptable risk or adequate safety is a value-
driven determination, varying greatly with each individual and 
each disease. The stakeholder most affected by that balance 
and best positioned to opine upon it is the patient. In fact, the 
patient may be the only person even qualified to make this de-
termination. Innovation concerns also require a patient’s per-
spective. The focus of device innovation is centered around and 
driven by patient needs.255 Devices are conceptualized only af-
ter identification of a particular patient need, and only devices 
that meet these needs can succeed in the market.256 Thus, the 
patient perspective is critical to a complete understanding of 
innovation. 
But the 510(k) Committee includes no patients or patient 
advocates. It is hard to justify this omission—it is easy to find a 
patient representative without any financial conflict, and many 
other IOM committees have included such an individual.257 
                                                          
 253. See generally Ben A. Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respect for Patient 
Autonomy: The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same, 10 
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 87 (2006) (discussing balancing these concepts); Nili 
Karako-Eyal, Physicians’ Duty of Disclosure: A Deontological and Consequen-
tial Analysis, 14 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 6–12 (2010) (also discussing this 
balance). 
 254. Activity: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Pro-
cess, supra note 18. 
 255. See Makower, supra note 230, at 31 (explaining that the focus of 
MedTech innovation is “completely patient need driven, not technology driv-
en”). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Many other IOM committees have included patient or consumer advo-
cates. For example, the Committee on Comparative Effectiveness Research 
Prioritization included a woman from the National Breast Cancer Coalition, 
who herself had survived breast cancer and radiation-induced sarcoma. See 
COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION & BOARD 
ON HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INST. MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 218 (2009), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12648. The Committee on Review 
of Omics-Based Tests for Predicting Patient Outcomes in Clinical Trials in-
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While the committee does include a number of physicians, they 
cannot speak for the patient—the patient, not the doctor, is the 
ultimate decision-maker.258 The argument that the physician 
can make these decisions for the patient is long discredited.259 
For example, studies have shown that physicians make differ-
ent decisions when they themselves are the patient—often rec-
ommending to their patients the treatment with the greatest 
chance of survival, while choosing for themselves the treatment 
with the lowest complication risk.260 “[M]edical decision-making 
can be a function of who the patient is as much as what the pa-
tient has.”261 Arguing that a patient representative is not capa-
                                                          
cluded a member from the Research Advocacy Network, a group “dedicated to 
advancing patient-focused research,” who was also an editor of a newsletter 
for patient advocates as well as a patient advocate herself. See Nat’l Acads., 
Committee Membership Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS., 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/committeeview.aspx?key=49273 (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2011). The committee on Accelerating Rare Diseases Research 
and Orphan Product Development included the founder of Parent Project 
Muscular Dystrophy, a woman who had lost two sons to the debilitating dis-
ease. See RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS, supra note 200, at 390. The 
committee on Identifying and Preventing Medication Errors included the pres-
ident of the nonprofit People’s Medical Society, one of “the most influential 
consumer health advocacy organizations in the United States.” See COMM. ON 
IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS & BD. ON HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES, INST. MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS: QUALITY CHASM 
SERIES 355 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11623. But see COMM. ON THE 
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. MED., THE FUTURE OF 
DRUG SAFETY 309-18 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11750 (omitting a patient or pa-
tient advocate on the committee). 
 258. See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Profession-
al Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 261, 266 
(2008) (“In both medical ethics and health law, patient autonomy has replaced 
medical paternalism as the dominant decision-making model.”). 
 259. Judge Cardozo may have said it best when he wrote: “Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body . . . .” Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 
93 (N.Y. 1914). See also Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Ad-
vance Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 133 & n.2 (2008) (“[P]hysician pater-
nalism has been widely rejected . . . .”); Rich, supra note 253, at 92 (explaining 
that “notions of beneficence and non-maleficence” are paternalistic and with-
out justification). 
 260. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., Physicians Recommend Different Treat-
ments for Patients than they Would Choose for Themselves, 171 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 630 (2011). 
 261. John B. McKinlay et al., Non-Medical Influences on Medical Decision-
Making, 42 SOC. SCI. & MED. 769, 769 (1996); see also Halevy, supra note 258, 
at 266–67 (explaining that unlike medical paternalism, the patient autonomy 
model recognizes that each patient is an individual who best “knows his values 
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ble of adding to the debate over this balance is simply paternal-
ism run amok. The patient (or patient advocate) provides a crit-
ical area of expertise and an essential perspective needed to as-
sess both questions of safety and innovation. Without such an 
individual, the committee is not fairly balanced for either func-
tion. 
VI. THE FDA CANNOT LEGALLY USE THE IOM 510(K) 
COMMITTEE’S REPORT 
As explained above, the IOM 510(k) Committee does not 
include any innovators, entrepreneurs, financiers, industry 
employees, patients, or patient advocates. These perspectives 
are critical for the committee to adequately evaluate the 510(k) 
system’s effect on patient safety and device innovation as well 
as to answer the seven additional issues it was asked to ad-
dress. Without these perspectives, the committee is not “fairly 
balanced” with respect to either expertise or viewpoints and, 
therefore, is not in compliance with FACA.262 Since the 510(k) 
Committee fails to comply with this statutory requirement, the 
FDA “may not use any advice or recommendation” this commit-
tee provides.263 
These omissions in committee membership are surprising, 
given the IOM’s usual diligence in appointing members to 
committees to ensure the requisite expertise and achieve fair 
balance.264 The IOM could easily have avoided the gaps in ex-
pertise and lack of balance on this committee by including any 
one of a number of qualified individuals. In fact, many such in-
dividuals already belong to the NAS or IOM, or have at least 
served on other committees in the past.265 It simply defies cred-
ibility that the IOM would fail to include essential experts and 
viewpoints on this particular committee when it already has 
highly vetted, extremely qualified individuals among its mem-
                                                          
and goals and thus is in the best position to make decisions regarding his life 
and health”). 
 262. See 5 U.S.C app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006). 
 263. Id. § 15(a). 
 264. See Our Study Process, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-
IOM/Study-Process.aspx (last updated May 24, 2011) (“Our consensus studies 
are conducted by committees carefully composed to ensure the requisite exper-
tise . . . .”). 
 265. See, e.g., supra note 200 and accompanying text (describing the inclu-
sion of a Medtronic executive on an IOM committee). 
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bership. Alternatively, the IOM could have looked beyond its 
membership to any one of a number of distinguished experts 
and leaders in the medical device field to obtain the required 
committee membership, but it did not do so. 
If the IOM was concerned about conflicts of interest, it 
could have simply disclosed these conflicts as it has done so 
many times before with other committees.266 When committees 
have evaluated drug innovation, pharmaceutical industry 
members were included on the committee.267 When committees 
have evaluated food safety, food industry members were on the 
committee.268 When committees assessed issues involving pa-
tient safety, patients or patient advocates were on the commit-
tee.269 In those cases, the individuals with conflicts of interest 
were deemed necessary to achieve balance and provide critical 
expertise, so the IOM classified those conflicts as “unavoida-
ble.” Here, however, the IOM seemingly concluded that a com-
mittee evaluating medical devices did not require anyone in-
volved in the device industry and that this committee 
evaluating patient safety did not require any patients or pa-
tient advocates. This inconsistency is both surprising and 
alarming, especially coming from an institution renowned for 
its thoroughness, objectivity, and balance. 
Furthermore, for purposes of FACA’s fair balance require-
ment, it is irrelevant that the Committee solicits advice from 
industry, holds open data-gathering meetings, or even encour-
ages open dialogue with outsiders who are not on the commit-
tee. It is also irrelevant that individuals with the expertise cur-
rently lacking from the committee may have been independent 
reviewers of the committee’s report before the report was is-
sued. While this type of public input and fairness in the review-
ing process is certainly desirable, and even legally required,270 
it does not compensate for the committee’s failure to achieve 
fair balance on the committee itself. Section 15’s “fair balance” 
requirement is a specific requirement that the committee must 
meet.271 Therefore, while stakeholder participation through 
these other methods is necessary and valuable, it is not alone 
                                                          
 266. See supra notes 191–210 and accompanying text. 
 267. See, e.g., supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text. 
 268. See, e.g., supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 270. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1)–(6) (2006). 
 271. Compare id. § 15(b)(1), with supra notes 107–111 and accompanying 
text. 
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sufficient to satisfy FACA section 15. 
As even the FDA has acknowledged, the IOM’s 510(k) 
Committee lacks sufficient expertise and fair balance to per-
form its functions of assessing patient safety and promoting in-
novation. As it has done many times before, IOM should have 
appointed qualified experts with these diverse backgrounds to 
provide critical expertise and balance. The IOM’s failure to do 
so has resulted in an incomplete and unbalanced committee, 
which threatens the integrity of the study and fails to comply 
with FACA’s requirements. The FDA is therefore statutorily 
forbidden from using any advice or reports this committee of-
fers. 
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE A BALANCED 
COMMITTEE 
It is essential that the 510(k) Committee, as well as any 
other government-commissioned IOM committee, is balanced, 
includes all necessary expertise, and complies with FACA re-
quirements. A failure to include appropriate membership on 
IOM committees has significant implications for the FDA, IOM, 
and the general public. 
The FDA is responsible for regulating the production and 
marketing of all foods, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and 
many other health products in the United States.272 Its “regula-
tions have considerable impact on the nation’s health, indus-
tries, and economy.”273 Government agencies, especially those 
that play as critical a role in society as does the FDA, are ex-
pected to utilize fair, accurate, and transparent processes when 
crafting rules and regulations. President Barack Obama recon-
firmed this expectation through his “Open Government Initia-
tive,”274 designed to “establish a system of transparency, public 
participation, and collaboration” in government.275 Part of this 
                                                          
 272. The Importance of Public Comment to the FDA, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143569.htm (last 
updated May 1, 2009). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Open Government Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.white 
house.gov/open (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 275. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), in 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 26, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpen 
Government/. 
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initiative was aimed at providing government decision-makers 
with a wider array of information through public input of ideas 
and expertise.276 In response, the FDA launched its own 
“Transparency Initiative” in June 2009.277 “Transparency in 
FDA’s activities and decision-making allows the public to better 
understand the Agency’s decisions, increasing credibility and 
promoting accountability.”278 
If the FDA begins to use or rely heavily on information 
provided by incomplete or unbalanced sources, especially when 
those sources purport to be fair and balanced, its ultimate deci-
sions may be uninformed and have undesirable effects. Mem-
bers of Congress have expressed this same concern. For in-
stance, Senator John Kerry recently wrote to the FDA 
Commissioner, urging her “to establish a deliberative and 
transparent process for reviewing the IOM recommendations 
that ensures adequate opportunity to solicit substantive and 
meaningful input from all stakeholder groups before any rec-
ommendations are finalized.”279 He was concerned that the rec-
ommendations may be “disruptive to the medical device indus-
try and could have a chilling effect on growth, jobs, and patient 
access to medical innovation.”280 A number of other members of 
Congress also wrote a letter to the IOM, expressing concern re-
garding the lack of expertise on the 510(k) Committee, and re-
questing opportunities for “substantive and meaningful partici-
pation by these stakeholders.”281 
Additionally, the public will also lose trust in the agency. 
                                                          
 276. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Office of Mgmt. & Budget to 
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m1
0-06.pdf (“Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and 
expertise so that their government can make policies with the benefit of in-
formation that is widely dispersed in society.”). 
 277. FDA Transparency Initiative, FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., http://www.fda. 
gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/ TransparencyInitiative/ (last visited Oct. 30, 
2011).  
 278. Executive Summary, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov 
/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/ExecutiveSummary/ (last updated 
June 3, 2010). 
 279. Letter from Sen. John Kerry to Hon. Margaret Ann Hamburg, 
Comm’r, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.thegraysheet.com/nr/FDC/SupportingDocs/gray/2011/041811_Kerr
y_IOM_letter.pdf. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Letter from Congress to David R. Challoner, Inst. of Med. (Mar. 1, 
2010) (on file with author). 
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An agency—such as the FDA, which has such a substantial im-
pact on public health and on which the public heavily relies—
must use committees that are fairly balanced in order to main-
tain its own credibility and authority. If the FDA intends to 
make major, controversial changes to the 510(k) clearance sys-
tem and plans on using an IOM committee’s recommendations 
when making those changes, that committee must include all 
necessary expertise and foreclose any appearance of bias. Oth-
erwise, it will be both irresponsible and illegal for the FDA to 
use the IOM report, and the FDA will lose the public’s faith. 
Furthermore, if the FDA is permitted to defer issues to 
IOM committees that fail to comply with section 15’s require-
ments rather than use its own advisory committees, notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or guidance development, the FDA will 
be able to completely circumvent FACA and other mechanisms 
for public involvement. FACA was designed to increase the 
public accountability of committees that advise federal agen-
cies.282 “What we are dealing with . . . goes to the bedrock of 
Government decision making. Information is an important 
commodity in this capital.”283 Section 15 was added to impose 
some of these requirements, albeit a watered-down version, on 
NAS committees, like the 510(k) Committee.284 Since official 
advisory committees are subject to far more rigorous notifica-
tion, access, monitoring, and other requirements than are IOM 
committees,285 it might be tempting for the FDA to simply use 
an IOM committee rather than an official federal advisory 
committee. If these IOM committees are not expected to comply 
with even the minimal section 15 requirements, then the FDA 
will be able to use IOM committees that remain unaccounta-
ble—unaccountable to the public, the government, and even its 
own institutional policies—in lieu of its own advisory commit-
tees. The result would be a governmental body receiving heavi-
ly relied-upon reports from committees that are unelected, in-
complete, unanswerable to, and disconnected from the 
public.286 This is exactly what FACA was intended to prevent. 
                                                          
 282. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 283. S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 4 (1972) (quoting Sen. Lee Metcalf). 
 284. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 286. As a side note, it is also irresponsible for the federal government, 
through the FDA, to spend taxpayer dollars on an IOM committee that con-
travenes federal law and that the FDA is legally prohibited from using. 
3 STENSVAD HALL FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 12:48 PM 
2012] LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES 121 
The IOM and the National Academies also have something 
to lose if this unbalanced committee proceeds. Although FACA 
only prohibits federal agency use of noncompliant NAS commit-
tees and does not prohibit NAS’s own formation or use of such 
committees, NAS’s reputation and work quality will deteriorate 
if it excludes necessary perspectives and fails to avoid actual or 
perceived bias. The National Academies produces 200–300 au-
thoritative reports each year, many of which influence policy 
decisions.287 Its recommendations carry so much weight be-
cause of “[t]he reputation of the institution for objectivity, in-
tegrity, independence, and competence,” which it considers to 
be “one of its most valuable assets.”288 The institution is re-
nowned for its thorough, robust, and objective research.289 Its 
members are some of the most respected and experienced pro-
fessionals in their fields.290 But the value of the institution’s 
work will suffer if its committees are unbalanced or lack crucial 
expertise—it will no longer be regarded as objective, and possi-
bly not even as competent. 
Additionally, the IOM’s failure to comply with its own in-
ternal policies regarding conflicts of interest, balance, and bias 
will irreparably damage its reputation. The IOM depends on its 
policies and procedures to ensure quality, objectivity and inde-
pendence. The public trusts that the IOM follows its own poli-
cies. This particular committee’s glaring failure to do so may 
cast a shadow over other IOM activities as well. There is little 
point in even having policies if the institution can selectively 
choose to follow them or not. By releasing this report, IOM has 
endangered its reputation for completeness, balance, and objec-
tivity. 
                                                          
 287. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68, at 2. 
 288. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra 
note 79, at 4; see also NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS, supra note 68, at 1 
(“Ensuring Independent, Objective Advice.”); NAT’L ACADS., 
http://www.nationalacademies.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (“The National 
Academies—Where the Nation Turns for Independent, Expert Advice.”). 
 289. See Our Reputation, supra note 86 (“Over many decades, the [National 
Academies] have earned a solid reputation as the nation’s premier source of 
independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues.”); 
Our Study Process, supra note 264 (“The IOM applies the National Academies’ 
rigorous research process, aimed at providing objective and straightforward 
answers to difficult questions of national importance.”). 
 290. The National Academies boasts that more than three hundred of its 
members are Nobel laureates and are among the world’s most distinguished 
experts in their fields. See Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.national 
academies.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
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Finally, much of what the 510(k) Committee does is secret 
already—it deliberates in closed meetings, does not disclose 
members’ curricula vitae or conflict-of-interest forms, and does 
not make its proposed recommendations available to the public 
for comment.291 “All analyses and drafts of the report remain 
confidential.”292 The committee only held three meetings that 
were open to the public.293 The “brief summaries” of the closed 
meetings provide little, if any, useful information.294 Even the 
material that is supposedly accessible to the public is not easy 
to obtain.295 Therefore, it is especially important for the IOM to 
comply with the few openness and balance requirements under 
section 15. It is not enough to allow stakeholder participation 
in other steps of the process, such as data-gathering. Nor is it 
sufficient to have individuals with the required, yet missing, 
expertise review the report after it is complete. The 510(k) 
Committee needed members on the inside who could provide 
much-needed perspectives and experience that were lacking—
and this is exactly what FACA prescribes. FACA dictates that 
the committee itself includes a fair balance of expertise and 
perspectives.296 Otherwise, critical expertise and viewpoints 
cannot be considered in any meaningful way. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The IOM 510(k) Committee’s purpose is to assess how well 
the current 510(k) process advances medical device innovation 
while simultaneously assuring patient safety. Safety and inno-
vation are unquestionably broad issues of national import, and 
the IOM’s recommendations will greatly affect the public 
health. Given the significance and breadth of this evaluation, 
the 510(k) Committee must contain broad membership includ-
ing inventors/innovators, entrepreneurs, product developers, 
                                                          
 291. See supra notes 151–166 and accompanying text; see also Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM/Study-
Process/FACA.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (explaining when committee 
processes are open to the public and when they are not). 
 292. Federal Advisory Committee Act, supra note 291. 
 293. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19 
(listing committee meetings). 
 294. See supra note 162 (describing the brief summaries). 
 295. See supra note 160 (explaining that both authors of this Article have 
inquired about available materials, receiving no response whatsoever). 
 296. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
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financiers, industry professionals, and patients or patient advo-
cates. These stakeholders can offer valuable, yet currently 
missing, insights into the current 510(k) system’s effect on safe-
ty and innovation. These are also the stakeholders that will be 
most greatly affected by the IOM’s recommendations and the 
FDA’s subsequent actions. 
Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not contain all 
of the required areas of expertise and perspectives, rendering it 
not “fairly balanced.” The IOM could have easily avoided these 
critical gaps in committee membership by appointing addition-
al qualified experts and individuals in these areas, as it rou-
tinely has done for other committees—but it did not do so. The 
actual content of the IOM report is irrelevant if the process 
used to arrive at that report is flawed. Thus, the current com-
mittee fails to comply with federal law and also fails to comply 
with its own internal policies regarding committee composition. 
As a result, the FDA is legally prohibited from using this 
IOM committee. However, we cannot unring a bell—now that 
this committee has issued its final report, it will be impossible 
to know whether the FDA saw it, read it, or used it. Any of the 
FDA’s subsequent actions may thereafter be legally challenged 
as a violation of FACA section 15. FDA may lose its credibility, 
and the IOM may have irreparably damaged its reputation for 
accuracy and objectivity. The IOM should have refrained from 
issuing a final report from this committee until this matter 
could be resolved. 
The 510(k) system is responsible for clearing most of the 
life-saving medical devices currently on the market. When con-
templating a major overhaul of a system as significant as the 
510(k) system, with the public health and entire U.S. medical 
device market at stake, the FDA must rely on accurate, in-
formed, and objective advice. It cannot be permitted to rely on 
an IOM committee that is unfairly balanced and in contraven-
tion of federal law and National Academies’ policies. These con-
cerns are not limited to only this particular committee—
expertise, fairness and balance are essential for all IOM com-
mittees that influence government decision-making. The IOM, 
and the government agencies that utilize the IOM, must be 
held accountable. The public deserves nothing less. 
 
 
 
 
